This paper presents a quality-driven approach to embodying non-functional requirements (NFRs) into software architecture using architectural tactics. Architectural tactics are reusable architectural building blocks, providing general architectural solutions for common issues pertaining to quality attributes. In this approach, architectural tactics are represented as feature models, and their semantics is defined using the Role-Based Metamodeling Language (RBML) which is a UML-based pattern specification notation. Given a set of NFRs, architectural tactics are selected and composed, and the composed tactic is used to instantiate an initial architecture for the application. The proposed approach addresses both the structural and behavioral aspects of architecture. We describe the approach using tactics for performance, availability and security to develop an architecture for a stock trading system. We demonstrate tool support for instantiating a composed tactic to generate an initial architecture of the stock trading system.
Introduction
Software development is initiated with application requirements which consist of functional requirements (FRs) and nonfunctional requirements (NFRs). Functional requirements describe the functionality of a system that supports user needs, while nonfunctional requirements impose constraints on how the system should accomplish the system's functionality, determining the quality of the system. The interdependency between FRs and NFRs requires consideration of both FRs and NFRs throughout the development. However, in practice, NFRs are often deferred for consideration until the late phase (Cysneiros et al., 2003; Zou et al., 2007; Xu et al., 2005) , which makes it difficult to satisfy NFRs and often necessitates changes to early development artifacts such as the architecture and the design. This is mainly attributed to the lack of techniques that help systematic embodiment of NFRs in the early development phase.
There has been some work on addressing NFRs at the architectural level (e.g., see Khan et al., 2005; Chung et al., 1999; Cysneiros and Leite, 2004; Franch and Botella, 1998; Metha and Medvidovic, 2002; Rosa et al., 2000; Xu et al., 2006; Zarate and Botella, 2000) . There are two major streams. One is to specify NFRs into the functional architecture of the application as architectural constraints. In this approach, NFRs and functional architectures are usually described in the same language for better compatibility. While this approach helps to check the satisfaction of NFRs, it does not provide a solution for NFRs. In the other approach, quality attributes (e.g., security, performance) in a specific domain are specified with domain constraints as reusable architectural building blocks which are used in building an application architecture or an architectural style for that domain. However, their building blocks are not general enough (i.e., domain-specific), and their granularity is coarse (e.g., one architecture building block per quality attribute), and hence significant tailoring work is required in order to satisfy specific requirements.
To address the above issues, we propose a systematic approach for building a software architecture that embodies NFRs using architectural tactics (Bass et al., 2003) . An architectural tactic is a reusable architectural building block that provides a generic solution to address issues pertaining to quality attributes. In this approach, architectural tactics are selected based on a given set of NFRs, and the selected tactics are composed to produce a tactic that exhibits the solutions of the selected tactics. The composed tactic is then instantiated to create an initial architecture of the application into which the NFRs are embodied.
We use feature modeling (Czarnecki and Eisenecker, 2000) to represent tactics and their relationships. We chose featuring modeling for the natural correspondence between the classification feature of feature modeling and the variable nature of tactics. In feature modeling, tactics and their variations are captured as features in a hierarchical form. Use of feature modeling helps to make architectural decisions for NFRs by offering an explicit set of solutions. Also, the relationships of tactics assure accompanied 0164 requirements (which are not always obvious) when a decision is made on a tactic.
The structure and behavior of tactics are described using the Role-Based Modeling Language (RBML) which is a UML-based pattern specification language developed in our previous work (France et al., 2004; Kim, 2007) . The RBML is chosen for its capability of capturing variations of architectural tactics. We present architectural tactics for availability, performance and security, and describe how the tactics can be used to embody NFRs of a stock trading system into the architecture of the system. We also demonstrate tool support for instantiating a composed tactic to generate an initial architecture of the stock trading system.
The major contributions of this paper are (1) the analysis of architectural tactics' relationships for availability, performance and security, (2) the semantic specifications of tactics for quality attributes, and (3) the mechanism for composing tactics to build a high quality architecture for a specific application that embodies the NFRs of the application.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a background on architectural tactics, feature modeling and the RBML, Section 3 presents feature models for availability, performance and security tactics and their semantic specifications in the RBML, Section 4 describes how availability, performance and security tactics can be composed, and how the composed tactic can be used to develop an architecture that satisfies NFRs of a stock trading system, Section 5 demonstrates tool support to instantiate the composed tactic to generate an initial architecture of the stock trading system, Section 6 gives an overview of related work, and Section 7 concludes the paper.
Background
In this section, we give an overview of architectural tactics which form the basis of this work, feature modeling for categorizing architectural tactics and the RBML for defining the semantics of an architectural tactic.
Architectural tactics
An architectural tactic is a fine-grained reusable architectural building block that provides an architectural solution built from experience to help to achieve a quality attribute. A tactic is a design decision that influences the concerned quality, and a collection of tactics forms an architectural strategy (Bass et al., 2003) . Related to other reusable architectural artifacts, architectural tactics may be viewed as foundational building blocks from which architectural patterns and styles are created (Bass et al., 2003) .
There are many architectural tactics (Bachmann et al., 2002; Bass et al., 2003; Ramachandran, 2002) for various quality attributes such as availability, performance, security, modifiability, usability and testability. The following are brief descriptions of some example tactics for availability, modifiability and security:
Exception -An availability tactic for recognizing and handling faults. Ping/Echo -An availability tactic for checking the availability of a component by sending ping messages. Heartbeat -An availability tactic for checking the availability of a component by listening to heartbeat messages from the component. Semantic Coherence -A modifiability tactic for lowering architectural coupling via inheritance while increasing cohesion. ID/Password -A security tactic for user authentication using IDs and passwords.
Maintain Data Confidentiality -A security tactic for protecting against unauthorized modifications of data using encryption.
A tactic may be either required or optional for a quality attribute. For example, a fault detection tactic is required for availability because it is a prerequisite for other tactics (e.g., fault recovery or recovery reintroduction) to recover the system (Bass et al., 2003) . Optional tactics provide the architect maneuverability in building an architecture according to his architectural strategy. The architect can choose optional tactics in various ways to strategically build an architecture. Tactics may be related to one another. A tactic may require another complementary tactic or exclude a conflicting tactic. For example, the Exception, Ping/Echo and Heartbeat tactics are often used together for rigorous fault detection. A tactic may also be refined into more concrete tactics that provide a specific solution to help to achieve the quality attribute related to the tactic. In some cases, use of tactics for one quality attribute may affect another quality attribute. For instance, use of both the ID/Password and Maintain Data Confidentiality tactics for security often decreases performance due to the encryption of login information.
Feature modeling
Based on our analysis in Section 2.1, we found feature modeling (Czarnecki and Eisenecker, 2000) suitable for representing the relationships among architectural tactics. Feature modeling is a design methodology for modeling the commonalities and variations of an application family and their interdependencies. A feature model consists of mandatory features capturing commonalities, optional features capturing variations, feature relationships representing logical groupings of features and configuration constraints. There are two types of groups, exclusive-or and inclusive-or. An exclusive-or group specifies that only one feature can be selected from the group, while an inclusive-or group denotes that one or more features can be selected from the group. Configuration constraints are feature relationships constraining feature selection. There are two types of relationships, requires and mutually exclusive. A requires relationship constrains that selection of one feature in the relationship requires the other feature. A mutually exclusive relationship specifies that the two features in the relationship cannot co-exist. In this work, we introduce another type of relationship, suggested to specify complementary relationships for a synergistic combination of tactics. Unlike requires relationships which are mandatory, suggested relationships are only suggestive. three mandatory subfeatures of LCD, Input Device and Battery and one optional subfeature of External Memory. An LCD can be either a normal screen or a touch screen, but cannot be both. This is specified by the exclusive-or group of the Normal and Touch Screen features which is denoted by the empty arc underneath the LCD feature. An input device can be a keypad or a digitized pen, or both. This is specified by the inclusive-or group of the Keypad and Digitized Pen features which is denoted by the filled arc underneath the Input Device feature. The requires constraint specifies that use of the Digitized Pen feature requires the Touch Screen feature. The Battery feature can be described similar to the LCD feature. The suggested relationship specifies that a large size battery is suggested when a touch screen is used due to more power consumption.
Role-Based Metamodeling Language
We use the Role-Based Metamodeling Language (RBML) to define the semantics of an architectural tactic. The RBML is a UMLbased pattern specification language developed in our previous work (France et al., 2004; Kim, 2007) . The RBML specifies tactic semantics in terms of roles (Kim et al., 2003) which are defined at the UML metamodel level and played by UML model elements (e.g., classes, messages). A role has a UML metaclass as its base and defines a set of constraints on the metaclass to tailor the type of elements that can play the role. Only the instances of the base metaclass that satisfy the constraints can play the role. Every role has a realization multiplicity which constrains the number of elements that can play the role. If it is not specified, the default multiplicity 1.. * is used, specifying that there must be at least one element playing the role. Realization multiplicity can also be used to specify the number of instances of a role to create in role instantiation. Major benefits of using the RBML for defining architectural tactics are that (1) the RBML facilitates the use of tactics at the model-level, and (2) the RBML is capable of capturing the generic structure of a tactic, and (3) the RBML enables instantiating a tactic in various structures through the realization multiplicity of roles, which facilitates reuse of tactics.
A Structural Pattern Specification (SPS) is a type of RBML specification, characterizing the structural aspects of an architectural tactic in a class diagram view. An SPS consists of classifier and relationship roles whose bases are the Classifier and Relationship metaclasses, respectively, in the UML metamodel. A classifier role is associated with a set of feature roles that determine the characteristics of the classifier role. A classifier role is connected to other classifier roles through relationship roles. An Interaction Pattern Specification (IPS) is another type of RBML specification, defining an interaction view of tactic participants in terms of lifeline and message roles whose bases are the Lifeline and Message metaclasses, respectively. Similar to the UML, IPSs are dependent upon an SPS.
For example, a lifeline role characterizes a set of lifelines that are instances of a classifier that plays the corresponding classifier role in the associated SPSs of the IPS. Fig. 2 shows an RBML specification for the Exception tactic for availability. In the figure, the upper compartment presents an SPS, and the lower compartment shows an IPS. Roles are denoted by the ''j" symbol. The SPS has two class roles, jExceptionNotifier and ExceptionHanlder which are associated via an association role jnotifies. The jExceptionHandler role has two behavioral feature roles, ðjnotifyExceptionðÞ and jhandleExceptionðÞÞ which constrain that a class playing the jExceptionHandler role must have operations playing the behavioral feature roles. In this paper, the classes playing a class role are considered to be architectural components, and associations playing association roles are considered to be pairs of provided and required interfaces (The Object Management Group, 2007) . The IPS specifies that when an exception occurs, the exception should be notified to an exception handler. We use the UML package notation to group related SPSs and IPSs for a tactic.
The RBML enables capturing the structural variations of tactics, which greatly influences the reusability of the tactic. A tactic is generic (i.e., application independent) and can be used in various contexts where its structure may differ to some extent. For instance, in one application only one instance of a tactic participant may be needed, while in another application two instances may be required. This can be captured by a realization multiplicity in the RBML. Such a variation frequently occurs, and tactic specifications that are capable of capturing it can be better reused. Tactic variability may also influence the quality concerned in the tactic. For example, the FIFO performance tactic, which involves producers, FIFO queues, and consumers, is concerned with scheduling requests for resources. In one case, there may be only one queue for all consumers, while in another case, multiple queues may be required, each for one consumer. In these cases, the latter has higher throughput than the former. A concrete example of the latter case is presented in Section 4.2.
Specifying architectural tactics
In this section, we define feature models for availability, performance and security architectural tactics and their semantics in the RBML. The feature models and RBML specifications are developed based on the work (Bachmann et al., 2002; Bass et al., 2003; Blazewicz et al., 2007; Cole et al., 2005; Ramachandran, 2002; Silberschatz et al., 2005) .
Tactics for availability
Availability is the degree to which an application is available with the expected functionality. There are several tactics for availability which can be categorized into fault detection, recoverypreparation and repair, and recovery reintroduction (Bass et al., 2003; Schmidt, 2006) as shown in Fig. 3 .
The Fault Detection tactic in Fig. 3 is concerned with detecting a fault and notifying the fault to a monitoring component or the system administrator. The Fault Detection tactic can be refined into Ping/Echo, Heartbeat and Exception tactics. The Ping/Echo tactic detects a fault by sending ping messages to receivers regularly. If a receiver does not respond to the sender within a certain time period, the receiver is considered to be failed. Fig. 4a defines the Ping/ Echo tactic.
The SPS in Fig. 4a shows that the Ping/Echo tactic involves three concepts: senders, receivers and a monitor which are captured by the jPingSender; jPingReceiver and jFaultMonitor roles, respectively. The jPingSender role is responsible for sending a ping message every certain time and waits for an echo from a ping receiver until the maximum waiting time. If an echo is not received within the maximum waiting time, an exception occurs, and it is detected by the fault monitor. The LOOP fragment in the IPS specifies that a sender sends a ping message to all receivers every time interval where rcvs in the LOOP denotes a function that returns the number of receivers. It should be noted that the LOOP operator is an RBML operator which constrains the structure of instantiations of the IPS (Kim, 2007) , not the UML loop operator. The inner loop fragment is the UML loop operator, describing that ping and echo messages are sent and received every specified time interval. If a receiver does not send an echo back within the maximum waiting time, the sender throws an exception to the monitor. This is captured in the Exception fragment which references the Exception tactic in Fig. 2 . The mapping specified in the Exception fragment describes the binding information between the Ping/Echo and Exception tactics. The realization multiplicity 1 in the jFaultMonitor role constrains that there must be only one monitor.
The Heartbeat tactic detects a fault by listening to heartbeat messages from monitored components periodically. A sender sends a heartbeat message to all the receivers every specified time interval. The receivers update the current time when the message is received. If the message is not received within a set time, the monitored component is considered to be unavailable. Fig. 4b defines the Heartbeat tactic.
Similar to the Ping/Echo tactic, the Heartbeat tactic involves three concepts, senders, receivers and a monitor, each of which is captured by the jHeartbeatSender; jHeartbeatReceiver and jFaultMonitor roles. The HeartbeatSender role is responsible for sending a heartbeat message periodically. The sent heartbeat message is received by a heartbeat receiver, and the last received time of a heartbeat message is updated, which is captured by the jupdateTimeðÞ role. The aliveness of heartbeat senders is checked regularly by comparing the latency time between the current time and last updated time in consideration of the max waiting time for the next heartbeat message. This is captured by the jcheckAliveðÞ role. The IPS specifies that sending heartbeat messages and checking aliveness are executed on separate threads for concurrency. When a fault occurs, the fault should be recognized, and an exception handler should be informed of it. This is captured in the Exception tactic. Typically, the component that raises an exception executes in the same process of the exception handling component. As shown above, the Exception tactic is usually used together with the Ping/Echo tactic and Heartbeat tactic for handling faults.
The Recovery Reintroduction tactic is concerned with restoring the state of a failed component. This tactic can be refined into Checkpoint/Rollback and State Resynchronization tactics. The Checkpoint/Rollback tactic keeps track of the state of the system either periodically or in response to a specific event. The time when the system's state is updated is called checkpoint. When a failure occurs in the system, the system is restored to the state at the most recent checkpoint before the system failed.
The State Resynchronization tactic restores the state of a source component through resynchronization with the state of a backup component. Fig. 5a shows the specification of the State Resynchronization tactic. The tactic involves concepts of a state resynchronization manager, source components and backup components. The state resynchronization manager is responsible for synchronizing the state of a source component with that of a backup component. A synchronization can occur either when the state of the source component is changed or when the source component is recovered from a failure. In the former case, the state of the backup components is synchronized with that of the source component. This is specified in the SynchronizeState IPS. The LOOP fragment specifies the state update of each backup component. On the other hand, in the latter case, the synchronization is opposite that the state of the source component is resynchronized with that of a backup component. This is specified in the RecoverState IPS.
The Recovery Preparation and Repair tactic is concerned with recovering and repairing a component from a failure. The tactic can be refined into Voting and State Redundancy tactics. The Voting tactic uses algorithm redundancy for recovery preparation. In the tactic, the same algorithm is run on redundant components, and the voter monitors the behavior of the components. When a component behaves differently from others, the voter fails the component. Although one component failed, the system itself still runs normal with other components.
Similar to the Voting tactic, the State Redundancy tactic uses redundant state data on multiple components for recovery preparation. There are two ways to use state redundancy. One is to select only one response from the responses that are received concurrently from redundant components for a service request. If a redundant component is failed, the tactic recovers the component by resynchronizing the state of the failed component with one of the other alive components. This is captured in the Active Redundancy tactic which is a subtactic of the State Redundancy tactic. The other way is to use the response from a specific component (primary) and inform other (backup) components to update the state of the backup components with that of the primary component. If the primary component fails, its state is resynchronized with the state of a backup component. This is captured in the Passive Redundancy tactic. Fig. 5b shows the specification of the Passive Redundancy tactic. The tactic involves concepts of clients, a primary component, backup components and a state resynchronization manager. When the primary component receives a request from a client that causes a state change, the primary component subsequently requests the state resychronization manager for a synchronization with backup component for the change. This is specified in the SynchronizeState IPS. 
Tactics for performance
Performance is concerned with various aspects including processing time, response time, resource consumption, throughput and efficiency. In this work, we focus on the response time of the system for events such as interrupts, messages or user requests. Tactics for performance can be classified into resource arbitration and resource management as shown in Fig. 6 .
The Resource Arbitration tactic is used to improve performance by scheduling requests for expensive resources (e.g., processors, networks). There are three general ways to schedule resource requests. One is to use FIFOs where requests are treated equally in the order in which they are received. This is known as the FIFO tactic which is defined in Fig. 7a . The FIFO tactic involves producers, FIFO queues and consumers which are specified by the jProducer; jFIFOQueue and jConsumer roles, respectively. The Enqueue IPS describes the behavior of enqueueing data, and the Dequeue IPS describes the dequeueing behavior. The FIFO tactic is often used for job distribution for threads and processes, especially in a network.
Another way is to assign priorities to resources, and the resource requests are scheduled based on priority. This is known to be the Priority Scheduling tactic. Using the Priority Scheduling tactic, performance can be improved by balancing the request load by priority. For example, a lower priority may be given to resources that have myriad requests. Priority can be given by assigning either a fixed priority or a dynamic priority, which is captured in the Fixed Priority Scheduling tactic and the Dynamic Priority Scheduling tactic, respectively.
The Fixed Priority Scheduling and Dynamic Priority Scheduling tactics may be complementarily used with the FIFO tactic to prevent the starvation issue for low priority resources. Fig. 7b shows the specification of the Fixed Priority Scheduling tactic. The tactic in- volves concepts of clients, a scheduler and requests queues. When a client requests for a resource, the scheduler assigns a fixed priority to the client based on a specific strategy (e.g., semantic importance, deadline monotonic) and then enqueues the request with the priority to the queue associated with the requested resource. This is specified in the ScheduleFixedPriority IPS. When the requested resource is available, the scheduler dequeues a request that has the highest priority and assigns the resource to the client. This is specified in the DispatchRequest IPS.
In the Dynamic Priority Scheduling tactic, priorities are determined at runtime based on execution parameters such as upcoming deadlines or other runtime conditions. Common policies used for determining priority are round robin and earlier deadline first (Silberschatz et al., 2005) . To support the dynamic assignment of priority, the Dynamic Priority Scheduling tactic involves the behavior of preempting a resource for a higher priority request and releasing the assigned resource from a request that has a lower priority. The specification of the Dynamic Priority Scheduling tactic is presented in Appendix A.
The Resource Management tactic improves performance by managing the resources that affect response time. One way for managing resources is to allocate threads or processes to resources for concurrent execution. In this way, waiting time in response can be significantly reduced. This is known to be the Introduce Concurrency tactic which is specified in Fig. 8a . The jConcurrentComp role in the tactic captures concurrent components that have their own thread or process. The double lines in the components denote concurrency. The Introduce Concurrency tactic is often used with a resource arbitration tactic for concurrent communication among threads or processes, which is specified by the suggested relationship in Fig. 6 .
Another way for managing resources is to keep replicas of resources on separate repositories, so that contention for resources can be reduced. This is called Maintain Multiple Copies tactic shown in Fig. 8b . The tactic involves concepts of clients, a cache, a cache manager and a data repository. The cache maintains copies of data that are frequently requested for faster access. When a data request is received, the cache manager first searches the cache. If the data is not found, then the cache manager looks up the repository and makes copies of the data into the cache. The Maintain Multiple Copies IPS in Fig. 8b shows the searching behavior. An important issue in this tactic is to maintain the consistency of the copies and keep them synchronized. This issue can be addressed by using the State Resynchronization tactic in Section 3.1.
Tactics for security
Security is concerned with preventing unauthorized usage of the system while providing its services to legitimate users. Various tactics have been introduced for security, and they can be classified into Resisting Attacks and Recovering from Attacks as shown in Fig. 9 .
The Resisting Attacks tactic provides several ways of protecting the system from attacks. One way is to check authentication of the user using the user's credentials (i.e., user IDs, passwords) which is in general considered to be an incipient protection. User credentials can be either set by the user or generated by the system every time the user uses the system. The former is known to be the ID/Password tactic, and the latter to be the Onetime Password tactics. Fig. 10a shows the specification of the ID/Password tactic. The AuthenticateID/Password IPS describes that an authentication request is denied if the user's credentials are not valid. In the ID/ Password tactic, a possible security breach could occur if the userID and password are exposed by an attack such as snooping (Bass et al., 2003) . To prevent this, the Onetime Password tactic can be used. In the tactic, the authenticator generates a secure value when an authentication request is received, and shares the value with the client. Then, the client and authenticator use the same secure value to generate the same password (Cole et al., 2005) . In this tactic, the client and authenticator are assumed to have the same algorithm for generating a password. The specification of the Onetime Password is presented in Appendix A. Another way of protecting a system is to restrict user access to data and services. This is known as the Authorize Users tactic. The tactic involves concepts of clients, resources and a reference monitor as shown in Fig. 10b . The AuthorizeUsers IPS in the figure describes that an access request is intercepted by the reference monitor to check permission. If a permission is found, the request is allowed, otherwise it is denied. This behavior can be more concretized for a specific access control model such as DAC, MAC or RBAC (Kim et al., 2006) . In many cases, users are assumed to have already been authenticated before they request for access to resources. This means that the Authenticate Users tactic is often used together with the Authorize Users tactic, which is specified by the suggested relationship between the Authenticate Users and Authorized Users tactics in Fig. 9 .
The Maintain Data Confidentiality tactic protects data from unauthorized modifications using encryption and decryption. Fig. 11a shows the specification of the Maintain Data Confidentiality tactic. The MaintainDataConfidentiality IPS in the figure describes that an encryptor encrypts data before sending, and a decryptor decrypts once the encrypted data is received. This tactic is often used together with the ID/Password tactic to protect the login information.
While the Resisting Attacks tactic is concerned with protecting a system, the Recovering from Attacks tactic helps to restore a system in a security regard. One way to restore a system is to maintain administrative data, which is critical for security, separately from user data and restore them separately. In this way, administrative data can be better protected, and so is the system. This is known as the Restoration tactic which is defined in Fig. 11b . Similar to the State Redundancy availability tactic in Section 3.1, the Restoration tactic uses state resynchronization, but separately for administrative data and user data as shown in the RestoreAdminState and RestoreUserData IPSs.
Case example: Stock trading system
In this section, we demonstrate how the availability, performance and security tactics presented in Section 3 can be used to embody NFRs of a stock trading system (STS) into its architecture. The STS is an online stock trading system that provides real-time services for checking the current price of stocks, placing buy or sell orders and reviewing traded stock volume. It sends orders to the stock exchange system (SES) for trading and receives the settlement information from the SES. The system can also trade options and futures. Fig. 12 shows a context diagram of the STS.
In addition to the functional requirements, the system has the following non-functional requirements for availability, performance and security:
NFR1. The STS should be available during the trading time (7:30 AM-6:00 PM) from Monday through Friday. If there is no response from the SES for 30 s, the STS should notify the administrator. NFR2. The system should be able to process 300 transactions per second 400,000 transactions per day. A client may place multiple orders of different kinds (e.g., stocks, options, futures), and the orders should be sent to the SES within 1 s in the order they were placed.
NFR3. The SES sends the trading information of about 600 items every second on average to the STS. Updating such a high volume of information imposes an intensive load on the STS's database, which may cause slow performance. In order to minimize the impairment of performance, updates should be the least possible. NFR4. Only authenticated users can access the system. The user credentials must not be seen to unauthorized personnel while transmitting the information to the system.
Tactic configuration
In this subsection, we describe how each of the above four NFRs can be embodied into architecture using architectural tactics. We assume that tactic selection is made by the architect based on his/her experience:
Configuring Tactics for NFR1. NFR1 is concerned with high availability of the system during trading time. To support this, the Ping/Echo and Heartbeat tactics in Section 2.1 can be used together. Using the Ping/Echo tactic, the availability of the STS can be checked by sending a ping message regularly and listening to an echo back. However, in some cases, the ping sender may receive an echo even if the STS is failed (Abawajy, 2004; Blazewicz et al., 2007; Stelling et al., 1999 tactic. Thus, the two jFaultMonitor roles are merged in the composed tactic. Given the binding rule, the following composition rules are defined: SPS_C1. Put the jPingReceiver and jHeartbeatSender roles into the same package role and name the package role jSubsystem1. SPS_C2. Put the jPingSender; jHeartbeatReceiver and jFaultMonitor roles into the same package role and name the package role jSubsystem2. IPS_C3. Create a parallel fragment of three operands. IPS_C4. Add the behavior of the two parallel operands of the CheckHeartbeat tactic into the first two operands of the new parallel fragment.
IPS_C5. Add the behavior of CheckPing/Echo tactic into the last operands of the new parallel fragment. IPS_C6. Name the composed IPS CheckAvailability. SPS_C1 and SPS_C2 defines the composition rules for SPSs. SPS_C1 specifies that ping receivers and heartbeat senders should be deployed in the same subsystem (a monitored subsystem). Similarly, SPS_C2 specifies that ping senders, heartbeat receivers and the monitor should be deployed in the same subsystem (a monitoring subsystem). This enables the monitoring subsystem to both send ping messages and receive heartbeat messages. IPS_C3 to IPS_C6 describe the composition rules for IPSs. These rules specify that the behavior of the Ping/Echo tactic and the Heartbeat tactic should be executed concurrently for IntroduceConcurrency :: jConcurrentComp # FIFO :: j Consumer These rules allocate a thread to each of FIFO producers and consumers, making it concurrent. By applying the binding rules, the FIFO and IntroduceConcurrency tactics are composed as shown in Fig. 14 . Configuring Tactics for NFR3. NFR3 is concerned with the performance of the STS's database which may be decreased by the intensive updates from the SES. The requirement states that the STS receives about 600 items per second. In general, when updates are received at such a high frequency, some items (e.g., stocks having less trades) may not have changes in every update. Taking into account this, many systems use caches to filter out the actual items that need to be updated by comparing the received update with the previous update. To support such selective updates, the Maintain Multiple Copies tactic can be used, introducing a cache, a cache client and a cache manager. Using the tactic, we have the cache client receive the update from SES, instead of the database. The cache client then requests the cache manager to update the received update. The cache manager looks up the previous update in the cache and compare it with the one that is received and identify the items that have changes. Only those items that have changes are updated in the database, which reduces the update load on the database. Configuring Tactics for NFR4. NFR4 is a common security requirement for most login-based systems. To support the confidentiality of login information, it is obvious that the ID/Password and the Maintain Data Confidentiality tactics should be used. Through the ID/Password tactic, only authenticated users are able to login the system. The encryption/decryption mechanism of the Maintain Data Confidentiality tactic prevents unauthorized access to the user information during transmission. The following defines the binding rules for composing the two tactics:
B1. 
B2.
MaintainDataConfidentiality :: jDecryptor # ID= Password :: jAuthenticator B3. MaintainDataConfidentiality :: jdata # ID=Password :: jid; j passwd The binding rules specify that the client requesting for authentication is responsible for encrypting the user ID and password, and the authenticator should be able to decrypt the login information. Given the binding rules, the following composition rules are defined:
SPS_C1. Merge the jEncryptor role with the jClient role, and name the merged role Client. SPS_C2. Add parameter roles jid and jpasswd to the jencryptðÞ behavioral feature role in the merged jClient role. SPS_C3. Merge the jDecryptor role with the jAuthenticator role, and name the merged role Authenticator. IPS_C4. Merge the MaintainDataConfidentiality IPS with the AuthenticateID/Password IPS, and name the merged IPS AuthendicateID/Password. IPS_C5. Place the jencryptðÞ message role before the jrequestAuthenticationðÞ role in the merged AuthenticateID/ Password IPS. IPS_C6. Place the jdecryptðÞ message role between the receipt of the requestAuthentication and jcheckAuthenticationðÞ roles in the merged AuthenticateID/ Password IPS. As the new parameter roles are added in SPS_C2 and SPS_C3, the same changes should be made to the corresponding message roles in the merged IPS. Fig. 15 shows the resulting tactic of composing the Maintain Data Confidentiality and ID/Password tactics.
In NFR4, the security concern is limited to secure login which has little impact on performance. However, if every order transaction is required to be encrypted, encryption may cause a non-trial overhead which may have impact on performance. This implies that security and performance may have conflicts, and a trade-off analysis of the two is necessary to minimize conflicts.
The three composed tactics in Figs. 13-15 and the Maintain Multiple Copies tactic addressing NFR3 are consolidated to build an initial architecture that embodies the NFRs of the STS via instantiation. Fig. 16 shows the consolidation of the composed tactics.
The composition rules for other possible tactic configurations can be found in Appendix B. The tactic configurations that are not presented in Appendix B are simple combinations (i.e., no composition is involved).
Building architectures
Given the tactic consolidation in Fig. 16 , an initial architecture for the STS can be instantiated. Fig. 17 shows an instantiated architecture where the stereotypes represent the roles from which the architectural elements are instantiated. For example, the stereotype PingSender in the OrderDlvPingSender component denotes that the component is instantiated from the jPingSender role in Fig. 16 .
Instantiating an architecture involves making certain architectural decisions such as the number of components to be instantiated or grouping instantiated components. The number of components to create is specified in the realization multiplicity of tactic roles. For instance, in Fig. 17 , there are three instances (StockQueue, OptionQueue, FutureQueue) of the jFIFOQueue role, each for one kind of orders. They are created by setting the lower bound of the realization multiplicity of the jFIFOQueue role to 3. Also, certain decisions for grouping instantiated components may be made. In Fig. 17 , the packages in bold line show the grouping decisions made. For example, the OrderingWebComp and CustomerMgmtComp components are grouped to be deployed in the same subsystem named Order Web Subsystem. Such a decision could be strategic or due to environmental constraints. The Client Subsystem package having only one component implies that the subsystem is to be deployed physically separate on the network. The StockCacheMgr, StockQuoteReceiveComp and StockQuoteCache components (which are instances of the jCacheMgr; jCacheClient and jCache roles of the Maintain Multiple Copies tactic) are grouped to be a cache subsystem which is responsible for receiving the update from the SES. The update() operation in the StockCacheMgr component is an instance of the jrequestðÞ role in the jCacheMgr role, tailored with the received update passed as a parameter and no return. A similar tailoring is made for the update() operation in the StockInfoDatabase component. The tailored operations are denoted in bold. It should be noted that the tailoring and the architectural decision made during instantiation are specific to the STS, and thus the tactics themselves should not be considered to be underspecified for not addressing them.
In summary, (1) the Order Delivery Subsystem with the Monitoring Subsystem embodies NFR1, and (2) the OrderingWebComp component, the three dedicated queues (StockQueue, OptionQueue, FutureQueue) and the three concurrent delivery components (StockOrderDeliveryComp, OptionOrderDeliveryComp, FutureOrderDeliveryComp) embody NFR2, and (3) the Stock Quote Subsystem with the StockInfoDatabase component embodies NFR3, and (4) finally, the WebClient component together with the CustomerMgmtComp component embodies NFR4. Fig. 18 shows another instantiation designed to support various types of clients such as mobile clients, web clients and PDA clients. This involves creating three instances of the jClient role as shown in Fig. 18 . As the platforms of clients are different, so are the formats of order information. This necessitates having a separate ordering component for each type of formats, which results in creating three instances of the jProducer role (OrderingWebComp, OrderingMobileComp, OrderingPDAComp), each of which is associated with the three kinds of stock queues as shown in Fig. 18 .
Tool support
In this section, we demonstrate tool support for automatic instantiation of architectural tactics. We use RBML Pattern Instantiator (RBML-PI) which was developed in our previous work to support instantiation of RBML specifications (Kim and Whittle, 2005) . RBML-PI is developed as an add-in component to IBM Rational Rose. We use RBML-PI to demonstrate how the consolidated tactic in Fig. 16 can be automatically instantiated to generate the architecture instance given in Fig. 18 .
Instantiating an architectural tactic using the RBML-PI involves the following steps:
1. Model the architectural tactic in Rose. Architectural tactics are specified by the RBML. Since the RBML is UML-based, any UML modeling tool that bears minor notational variations (e.g., the bar symbol for roles) can be used. 2. Determine the number of instances to create for the roles in their the realization multiplicity. 3. Name the instantiated elements specific to the context of the application. 4. Group the instantiated components according to an architectural strategy if any. 5. Tailor the instantiated elements specific to the application as needed.
By carrying out Step 1, the consolidated tactic in Fig. 16 is drawn in Rose as shown in Fig. 19 . In the figure, the tree in the left compartment shows a list of the roles involved in the consolidated tactic, and the right compartment shows the SPS of the consolidated tactic. The window appeared on the right shows an example of the properties of a role specified in Rose, which is carried out by
Step 2. The window shows that the base metaclass and the realization multiplicity of the jPingSender role is set, respectively, to the Classifier metaclass and 1.. * . The metaclass constrains that the type of instances of the role must be Classifier, and the lower bound of the multiplicity constrains that there must be at least one instance of the role. This results in creating one class for the role as its instance. Resulting from Step 3 through 5, Fig. 20 demonstrates how the architecture given in Fig. 18 can be instantiated using RBML-PI.
RBML-PI generates model elements based on the properties of roles specified in the consolidated tactic with an ad-hoc name given by the tool. The names are changed in Step 3 specific to the STS. The model elements are then grouped strategically in Step 4. We used the note notation for grouping components instead of the package notation to explicitly show the details of the grouped components since packages in Rose hide the contained elements. However, in actual development, packages should be used as shown in Fig. 18 . In
Step 5, the instances of the jrequestðÞ role in the CacheMgr and StockInfoDatabase are tailored for updating.
Related work
There has been much work addressing NFRs at the architecture level. Chung et al. (1999) proposed a framework that guides the selection of architectural design alternatives for NFRs. In the framework, NFRs are expressed as goals, and complementing and conflicting relationships of goals are expressed in and and or relationships. Goals are refined into lower-level goals which are eventually concretized into solutions. While their architectural solutions are specific to an application, the architectural tactics in our work are generic, and as such reusable. More importantly, they do not define the semantics of architectural methods.
Based on Chung et al.'s work (Chung et al., 1999) , Cysneiros and Leite (2004) presented an approach for eliciting NFRs and realizing them in a conceptual model using Language Enhanced Lexicons (LELs) which capture domain vocabularies. In their work, a quality attribute is designed as a goal graph where each node in the graph specifies conditions in terms of lexicons. When a modeling element (e.g., use cases, classes) pertaining to a quality attribute is developed, the element is checked for the lexicons involved in the quality attribute. If any of the lexicons is involved in the element, the conditions specified in the goal graph of the attribute is checked for the element. Their approach is for verifying NFRs, rather than embodying NFRs.
Some researchers (Khan et al., 2005; Franch and Botella, 1998; Rosa et al., 2000) have attempted to incorporate NFRs directly into architecture. Rosa et al. (2000 Rosa et al. ( , 2001 describe NFRs in the Z language (Spivey, 1988) and specify them as quality constraints in an architecture. Similar to Rosa et al., Khan et al. (2005) specify NFRs in WRIGHT Allen (1997) as constraints for components and connectors. Franch and Botella (1998) proposed NoFun, a language for describing NFRs in architecture components and connectors. Based on Franch et al.'s work, Zarate and Botella (2000) translate NoFun NFRs into expressions of Object Constraint Language (OCL) (Warmer and Kleppe, 2003) which are attached as notes in UML class diagrams. While these works help ensuring the satisfaction of NFRs, they do not provide a concrete solution to embody NFRs into architecture. Also, their notations are not standardized, which makes it difficult to adapt their approaches. Metha and Medvidovic (2002) proposed architectural primitives which are reusable architectural building blocks that specify quality attributes. Architectural primitives are incorporated into an architectural style, and NFRs are embodied into an architecture by extending the architectural primitives in the architectural style (e.g., client-server). Architectural primitives are described in Alloy (Jackson et al., 2001 ). The architectural primitives in their work can be viewed as architectural tactics in our work. However, their approach assumes that architectural styles are used in an architecture design, which we view as a restriction. From an architect's point of view, use of architectural style should be optional. Xu et al. (2006) classifies NFRs into operationalizable NFRs and checkable NFRs. Operationalizable NFRs are those that can be realized by functional components, and quality attributes of operationalizable NFRs are designed as an Aspectual Component. Checkable NFRs are those that can be checked or verified, and quality attributes (e.g., performance) of checkable NFRs are designed as a Monitoring Component. Aspectural and monitoring components are described in a programming template which is woven with a functional architecture based on a set of binding rules that are described in XML. While use of templates simplifies the weaving process, templates cannot capture structural variations of components. The nature of templates lends themselves only to stamping out the same structure in instantiation without having any variation point. Their classification can be related to the classification of execution quality and evolution quality by Matinlassi and Niemela Matinlassi and Niemela (2003) which is more commonly used. Operationalizable and checkable NFRs can be considered as subsets of execution quality which is concerned with observable qualities (e.g. performance, security, availability) at run-time. In terms of coverage, the classification by Matinlassi and Niemela is broader since it also covers evolution qualities. Bruin and Vliet (2001) proposed a refinement-based approach for developing a software architecture that addresses quality concerns (e.g., security, performance). In their approach, quality requirements are analyzed in terms of features, and the features are mapped to architectural solutions which are based on a specific architecture style (e.g., peer-to-peer, client-server). Feature-solution (FS) graphs are used to represent quality features, architectural solutions and their mapping. Architectural solutions are represented as a tree structure where each node represents a particular architectural solution (e.g., Firewall, Encryption/Decryption) in the architectural style. The semantics of an architectural solution is defined using a use case map (UCM) (Buhr, 1998) which captures the structural and behavioral aspects of the solution with refinement points where other solutions can be plugged in. The root node of a solution structure provides a basic architectural structure for the application, and the structure is refined with other solutions mapped with quality features in the FS graph. Architectural solutions in their work can be viewed as architectural tactics in our work. However, our tactics are not dependent on any architectural style. We argue that defining tactics for a specific architectural style would significantly limit the reusability of tactics. Also, the generic nature of architectural tactics makes themselves inappropriate to be specific to an architectural style. The tactics in our work can be used to realize a specific architectural style as in their work. We would also like to pose a counter point on their arguments that activity diagrams in the UML are the closest type to UCMs, and activity diagrams are not able to capture both structural and behavioral aspects in one diagram, which lead them to use UCMs to define the semantics of architectural solutions. Firstly, we point out that communication diagrams in the UML 2.0 (which was previously called collaboration diagrams in UML 1.x) can specify both structural and behavioral aspects, and thus communication diagrams are the closest to UCMs, not activity diagrams. Secondly, showing both structural and behavioral aspects in one diagram has little benefit over showing them separately. Mixing the two different aspects in one diagram often makes it hard to understand and specify the details of each aspect. For example, inheritance structure or iterative behavior cannot be specified in UCMs.
Conclusion
We have presented a systematic approach for embodying NFRs into software architecture using architectural tactics. Major benefits of the approach are that (1) the RBML allows one to precisely specify tactics, (2) the rigorous tactic composition rules enable systematic composition of tactics, (3) the variations captured in tactic specifications allow various tactic intantiations, and thus improve tactic reuse, and (4) fine-grained solutions of tactics enables strategic architecture development through various configurations. It should be noted that not all tactics can be specified in the RBML. For instance, the resource demand tactics (Bass et al., 2003) , which are concerned with managing resource demand, are difficult to formalize in the RBML due to the abstract nature of their solutions. For such tactics, a manual realization is required based on the experience of the architect. While we assumed in this paper that tactic selection is made by the architect, it is possible to automate tactic selection. One approach which we are currently investigating is using metrics and inference systems. In the approach, features and NFRs are quantified using metrics, and the quantified NFRs are projected as constraints into the quantified features via an inference system (e.g., Prolog) to infer valid feature configurations that satisfy the quantified NFRs. The architect then can simply choose one configuration from the result.
Performance
When the presented approach is applied for other quality attributes such as modifiability and usability, a comprehensive analysis of the attribute domain should be conducted so as to find available tactics and define a complete set of composition rules for the tactics. Also, tactics in different quality attributes may be related to one another, which requires an analysis across the domains of the involved quality attributes.
